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THE SPIRIT VERSUS THE LETTER
MADALINE KINTER REMMLEIN *

The social and educational impact of the decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States in the public school segregation cases 1 has been reviewed in the literature. 2 The social and
educational effects of the decision are of utmost importance and
the efficacy of the Court's pronouncement will depend in large part
upon the solution of these practical problems looming so large in
the minds of all of us. Nevertheless, this author feels that lawyers
are interested also in certain features of the decision that are
peculiarly pertinent in the practice of law, apart from the subject
matter of the decision.
EFFECT OF INTENT, IF DISCERNABLE

The Court asked counsel to compile evidence, if any exists,
that the Congress which submitted and the states which ratified the
Fourteenth Amendment contemplated that it would or would not
abolish segregation in the public schools. In this request was embodied the implication that the Court would be influenced by the
intent, if it could be ascertained.
Attorneys arguing in favor of segregation concluded that the
objective of the Amendment was to guarantee certain basic rights
to the Negro, but that, in the words of the attorney general for
the State of Kansas, "the right to mingle with other races in the
public schools" was not included in this concept of basic rights.
Furthermore, it was argued it could not be said that the states
ratifying the Amendment understood that it would abolish segregation in the public schools, since the majority of these states
authorized segregation at the time the Amendment was ratified.
Attorneys arguing against segregation concluded that the Thirtyninth Congress which proposed the Fourteenth Amendment and
the states that ratified it intended the Amendment to make no
distinctions between the races. Both sides relied upon the record
of debates among members of Congress, skimming over the fact
that records of discussions within the states are meager, if not
entirely lacking.
The question was faced squarely in the briefs filed by the
United States Department of Justice. When the Thirty-ninth Congress had the Amendment under consideration, those for it and
those against it understood that the Amendment would have broad
*Assistant Director, Research Division, National Education Association,
Lecturer in School Law,- The George Washington University, Member of the District of Columbia Bar, Member of the Supreme Court of the United States Bar.
I Brown v. Board of Education, Briggs v. Elliott, Davis v. County School
Board, Gebhart v. Belton, 74 S. Ct. 686; Bolling v. Sharpe, 74 S. Ct. 693; Docket
Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, October 1954 Term.
2E.g., "Next Steps in Racial Desegregation in Education," Journal of Negro
Education Yearbook Number, Summer 1954. Vol. XXIII, No. 3. 399 p.; Journal
of Public Law, Vol. 3, No. 1. Emory University Law School, 'Emory University,
Georgia, Spring 1954.
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implications; but, both sides mentioned only a few examples, not
including the public schools. Records to indicate the understanding
of the states are incomplete; where such records exist, there are
almost no references to the public schools, and the Department of
Justice concluded that possibly the state legislators "were unaware
that the Amendment had a bearing on education even to the extent of requiring equal though separate schools."
Soon after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress debated proposed legislation on civil rights. Some of those
who opposed the bill mentioned that, if enacted, it would have an
effect on the right of Negroes to attend the public schools; those
who proposed the bill did not deny that it would have such an
effect. Many of the congressmen who debated the civil rights bill
had helped frame the Fourteenth Amendment. A little indirect
light is reflected on the meaning of the Amendment itself in the
debate on this legislative proposal in that some congressmen opposed passage of the bill because they believed it did not grant the
Negro any rights he did not already possess under the Amendment.
The important aspect of the inquiry into the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment is that the evidence was inconclusive.
Presumably the Court could answer its own question in the affirmative or in the negative, depending upon its interpretation of the
weight of the evidence. The Court had to decide whether or not
an application of the Amendment could be adopted because it was
warranted by the apparent policy of the Amendment, although
such an application was not also affirmatively supported by the
legislative history showing 'that its framers and ratifiers so
intended.
It is a maxim in statutory construction that the legislative
intent must be followed. It is questionable whether the same principle should be applicable to the construction of a constitutional
provision; even so, courts need give little attention to debates in
the legislative halls when the evidence is inconclusive. Furthermore, debate on a constitutional amendment is of less materiality
than debate on an ordinary legislative bill because the amendment
must be ratified in the states before it becomes effective. Who can
say that the ratifiers had in mind the same meaning as the congressmen who proposed an amendment? In Maxwell v. Dow 3 the
Court said,
• . . the question whether the proposed amendment itself expresses the meaning which those who spoke in its
favor may have assumed that it did, is one to be determined
by the language actually therein used and not by the
speeches made regarding it. What individual senators or
representatives may have urged in debate . . . does not
furnish a firm ground for its proper construction.
In addition, ample precedent exists for construing constitu' 176 U. S. 581, 601-602 (1900).
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tional provisions in the light of present-day situations rather than
according to situations existent at the time the provision was
adopted. "A principle to be vital, must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth."'4 Ever since Mr.
Chief Justice Marshall spoke his much-quoted warning that "we
must never forget that is a constitution we are expounding,"., the
Court has often demonstrated its awareness of changing times.
In Home Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell,6 Mr. Chief
Justice Hughes said,
If by the statement that what the Constitution meant
at the time of its adoption it means today, it is intended
to say that the great clauses of the Constitution must be
confined to the interpretation which the framers, with the
conditions and outlook of their time, would have placed
upon them, the statement carries its own refutation.
The Court has intimated that it is especially necessary for a
court to take cognizance of changing concepts of constitutional
provisions when basic rights are at issue. In Wolf v. Colorado,Mr. Justice Frankfurter said,
Basic rights do not become petrified as of any one
time, even though as a matter of human experience, some
may not theoretically be called eternal verities. It is of
the very nature of a free society to advance in its standards of what is determined reasonable and right. Representing as it does a living principle, due process is not
confined within a permanent catalog of what may at a
given time be determined the limitation or the essential
of fundamental rights.
Thus, we have in the public-school segregation decision a
demonstration in statutory construction applied to a constitutional
amendment involving fundamental rights of our people. The Court
apparently took the view that the intention of the framers and
the ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment was immaterial, especially because it was not conclusively proved; but, regardless of
proof, because the Amendment must be interpreted today in the
light of today's conditions.
FEDERAL POWER OVER STATE'S RIGHTS

The Tenth Amendment to the Constitution reserves to the
states all powers not delegated to the federal government. That
public education is not a delegated power has been so well accepted
that documentation should be needless. In 1899 it was claimed
that the public-school system was unconstitutional under the Four4

Weems v. United States, 217 U. S. 349, 373 (1910).
McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 407 (1819).
'290 U. S. 398, 442-43 (1934).
338 U. S. 25, 26 (1949).
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teenth Amendment; however, Mr. Justice Harland made the following statement in Cumming v. County Board of Education,8
The education of the peor1 ' in schools maintained by
state taxation is a matter belonging to the respective
states, and any interference on the part of federal authority with the management of such schools cannot be justified except in the case of a clear and unmistakable disregard of rights secured by the supreme law of the land.
(Italics supplied)
Thirty-eight years later, a more categorical statement was
made by Mr. Chief Justice Taft speaking for the Court in Gong
Lum v. Rice,9 "The right and power of the state to regulate the
method of providing for the education of its youth at public expense is clear." Since then, however, the Court has established
new precedent for vindicating rights secured by the Fourteenth
Amendment in public-school situations, even before the turning
point in segregation cases at the graduate-school level. In West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,10 the statement
was made that
the very purpose of a bill of rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and
officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts.
If the Tenth Amendment were to be interpreted as leaving
each state entirely free to choose the type of school system it desires,
no federal court could substitute its judgment for the choice made
by a state. Howvever, though public education is a power reserved to
the states, the judicial power of the Court extends to matters
within the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment.
CONCURRENT JURISDICTION OF CONGRESS AND THE COURTS

The fact that an issue touches upon political matters does not
render the Court incompetent to decide questions of constitutional
rights. Judicial power has been said to be lacking in some cases
where the matter was purely political.'' These cases, of course,
differ from those which are primarily constitutional questions,
though they may have political undertones.
Review of the election returns and qualifications of the members of Congress is outside the jurisdiction of the courts because
it is a matter specifically delegated to the Congress itself, 12 and by
implication denied the judiciary. That the implementation of the
- 175 U. S. 528, 545 (1899).
'275 U. S. 78, 85 (1927).
"319 U. S. 624, 638, 639-40 (1943).
The Protector, 12 Wall. 700 (1872).
"U. S. Const. Art. I, sec. 5.
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Fourteenth Amendment does not fall into the same category is
evidenced by many cases preceding the current segregation decision. They are too numerous to cite. Nevertheless, the possibility
was suggested that implementation of the Fourteenth Amendment
is a political issue delegated by the Constitution to Congress in
Section 5 of the Amendment.
Many of us forget that the Amendment contains more than
the statement of basic rights which is in Section 1. Section 5 reads,
"The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." The question then was
whether congressional action was prerequisite to application of the
Amendment to segregated schools or whether the Court could make
the application in the absence of congressional action.
If the right of Negroes to attend the public schools with white
children was clearly within the meaning of the Amendment, the
judicial power to so declare was acknowledged; but, those who
opposed this interpretation of the Amendment argued that Congress had exclusive jurisdiction to extend the federal control into
"undefined areas on the periphery of equal protection." The Court
-any court-has no power to legislate, particularly beyond the
limits of the Constitution. So, the scope of judicial power depended in part on the meaning to be given the Amendment itself.
Congress has acted to prohibit certain types of segregation
and thus has exercised its authority under Section 5 of the Amendment. It has the power to do likewise with regard to the public
schools if it chooses, the Tenth Amendment notwithstanding.
The attorney general for the State of Kansas urged the Court
to assume the same attitude toward the schools as it had with regard to the commerce clause of the Constitution. Section 8 of
Article I enumerates the powers of Congress. Subsection 3 empowers Congress "to regulate Commerce with foreign nations, and
among the several states, and with the Indian Tribes." In Cooley
13
v. Board of Wardens of Philadelphia,
the Court pointed out in
1851 that the grant of a power to Congress cannot be divorced from
the subject matter of the grant; and in holding that the states had
the right t6 legislate with regard to pilots the Court said that its
decision
. * . does not extend to the question what other subjects, under the commercial power, are within the exclusive control of Congress, or may be regulated by the
states in the absence of all congressional legislation; nor
[does the opinion refer] to the general question, how far
any regulation of a subject by Congress, may be deemed
to operate as an exclusion of all legislation by the states
upon the same subject.
In the absence of federal action (by Congress) the states may
enact laws regulating interstate commerce as to matters of local.
"112 How. 299, 320 (1851).
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concern. This principle has developed under the commerce clause;
it does not necessarily thereby apply to other subjects, as indicated in the Cooley case. The Court refused to make a similar application to the public schools.
Because of the inclusion of Section 5, which empowers Congress
to implement the rights guaranteed by Section 1, there is no reason
why judicial power should be denied in an area within which Congress has not acted. Concurrent power exists. The Court has construed the Amendment many times in circumstances on which Congress had not legislated. 14 These many decisions, including the
recent graduate-school segregation cases, would have to be overruled if that theory were not to prevail.
Individuals injured by violation of the Fourteenth Amendment have never been denied access to the courts merely because
Congress has not acted to provide general remedial legislation. 15
When Congress exercises its power to enforce the Amendment,
"the majestic generalities of the Fourteenth Amendment are thus
reduced to a concurrent statutory command.'- 6 So weighty are
the precedents that to hold today that Congress has exclusive jurisdiction would be a complete reversal of scores of decisions and
would nullify the effectiveness of our Bill of Rights.
EQUITY POWER OF THE COURT

The Court has jurisdiction in equity as well as in law. The
Court has the power to use its discretion in shaping equitable decrees and in controlling their execution so as to protect public
interest. 7 By act of Congress, the Court has power to enter "such
appropriate judgment, decree or order or require such further proceedings to be had as may be just under the circumstances."",
When a legal right has been violated and will continue to be violated, the individual is entitled to relief which will be effective to
redress the wrong. However, the Court must take into account
not only the rights of the parties but the public interest as well.
A court of equity is not restricted to particular forms of relief. It has full power to direct whatever remedy it considers will
14Even

in this particular subject matter:

Sweatt v. Paintbr, 399 U. S. 629

(1950); McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U. S. 637 (1950); Sipuel v.
Board of Regents, 332 U. S. 631 (1947); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305
U. S. 337 (1938). In other fields: Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649 (1944),
with respect to voting; Henderson v. United States, 339 U. S. 815 (1950), with
respect to travel; Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1 (1948), with respect to land
ownership; District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson Co., 346 U. S. 100 (1953),
with respect to restaurants; Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Howard, 343
U. S. 768 (1952), with respect to employment; Avery v. Georgia, 345 U. S. 559
(1953), with respect to jury service.
"Virginia v. Rives,. 100 U. S. 313 (1880). But see Ex parte Virginia, 100
U. S. 339 (1880), never followed in subsequent cases, of which there have been
many, including those cited supra note 14.
16Fay v. New York, 332 U. S. 261, 282-83 (1947).
"1Securities and Exchange Commission v. U. S. Realty and Improvement

Co., 310 U. S. 434 (1940); U. S. v. Morgan, 307 U. S. 183 (1939); Virginia Ry.
Co. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U. S. 515 (1937).
"28 U. S. C. 2106.
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best serve the ends of justice in the particular circumstances.
Therefore, conventional remedies are often adapted to meet the
needs of unusual situations. In connection with the citation of
instances where decrees have been adjusted to meet particular circumstances, the Court's opinion in Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit
Products 19 included the following colorful statement,
The creative analogies of the law were drawn upon
by which great equity changes, exercising imaginative
resourcefulness, have always escaped the imprisonment
of reason and fairness within mechanical concepts of the
common law.
In granting relief to civil cases against a practice or conditions found to be unlawful, courts have frequently suspended the operation of their decrees on grounds of inconvenience to the public or undue hardship to the wrongdoer and
have allowed sufficient time for removing the illegality.2 0 The
Court on May 17 followed these precedents. It declared the principle of law but postponed direction of the remedy to allow the
parties concerned and other collaterally interested to study and
plan procedures to correct the unlawful practices and conditions.
The postponement of the decrees was not only within the judicial
power but was in the interest of the public.
On December 6 the Court will hear proposals of the several
states with regard to their plans for eliminating the unconstitutional segregation of races in the public schools. The interval
between pronouncement of illegality and the final disposition of
the issues by the Court raises many other questions of constitutional law and judicial practice.
INTERIM UNCERTAINTIES

Questions that lawyers, educators, and laymen are asking
during these months between May 17 and the issuance of the final
decrees pertain to the breadth of the decision. Does the decision
apply only to the individuals who instituted the five cases included
in the opinions of May 17? How does the pronouncement of unconstitutionality affect similar practices in other jurisdictions?
Have provisions in state constitutions and state laws permittng or
requiring segregated schools been ipso facto nullified? Should
states that have practiced segregation but that were not parties
in the five cases participated in the hearings scheduled for December 6? If they do, does their participation alter their status
after the final decrees are entered?
Briefs Amicus Curiae
When the Court asked the parties in the segregation cases to
return months later to discuss plans for implementing the de19322 U. S. 607, 620-22 (1944).

" United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U. S. 106 (1911); Georgia v.
Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U. S. 230 (1907); Northern Securities Co. v. U. S.,
193 U. S. 197, 360 (1904).

410
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cision of May 17, it also invited other states with segregated
schools though they were not parties to these cases. Of the 17
states primarily concerned with the decision, directly or indirectly,
some have accepted and some have declined to participate in the
December hearings. Those which have declined are convinced that
to accept would make them subject to the instructions ensuing
thereafter from the Court. Those which have accepted the opportunity to place before the Court the problems they will face in
complying with the principle of integrated schools have accepted
for one or both of two reasons: They wish to abide by the law as
interpreted by the Court on May 17 or they have been assured that
to participate in the hearings does not make them subject to the
Court since they were not parties to the original suits.
Since learned counsel in the several states have taken opposite
views on the effect of filing a brief or appearing for oral argument
when not a party to the suit, it is in order to examine into the
facts and the motives that may be behind each point of view.
Participation in a case by one not a party is permissible with the
consent of the court and the parties to the action. Such participation at the invitation of a court sets the stage even more precisely
than when the participation is at the request of a nonlitigant.
These participants are invited to give information to the Court,
information which will assist the Court in making its decision.
The participation is as a friend of the court.
Briefs amicus curiae are quite common. The only unusual
feature in this instance is that the Court extended the invitation;
whereas, ordinarily the friend of the court takes the initiative.
The legal effect is the same. Unlimited experience has proved that
the decision in a case in which friends of the court have filed briefs
or assisted in oral argument has not subjected them to the jurisdiction of the court. Therefore, it appears that the expressed fear
of making themselves subject to subsequent instructions by the
Court hides deeper fear of showing the Court plans for circumventing the decision.
Those who have agreed to participate in the December hearings have indicated their willingness to abide by the decision even
though they are not parties to these cases. They are interested in
laying before the C6urt their problems in attempting to desegregate the schools so that the Court's final disposition of the current
cases will take into consideration all the problems, which admittedly differ in different jurisdictions. There is also the thought
that proposals for putting the decision into effect may be approved
by the Court so as to avoid future litigation.
Those who have refused to participate in the December hearings, on the other hand, have indicated their intention to continue
segregated schools if a way can be found to do so. They cannot
present to the Court an informative brief showing problems and
plans in an unbiased way. They have declared that they will not
take any steps toward the desegregation of their schools unless
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and until forced to do so by an order directed specifically to litigants within their own jurisdiction.
It seems that no question could be seriously considered as to
the effect of filing a brief as a friend of court in typical cases.
Therefore, those who have expressed the fear that doing so in this
instance would subject them to instructions from the Court are
using this threat to avoid placing their plans before the Court,
expecting thereby to develop some scheme that will at least delay
desegregation, that will necessitate future litigation, in the hope
that the Court may eventually circumscribe the flat pronouncement
of May 17.
As a matter of fact, all states which have practiced segregation in the public schools will be bound indirectly by the decree
regardless of whether they have individually been parties to the
five current cases or participants in the December hearings as
friends of the Court. The applicability of the decrees will be less
direct but probably just as influential ultimately in the states that
boycott the hearings as in those participating.
Class Suits
In each of the five cases decided on May 17, the individuals
instituting the suits pleaded for relief for themselves and for all
other similarly situated. They were class suits. Therefore, the
decrees will be applied not only to the children whose names appear
in the pleadings in these particular cases but to all children attending the public schools in these jurisdictions. Since the constitutional provisions and state laws declared to be unconstitutional
have statewide application in most instances, the decrees may be
said to be applicable to all children within those states.
The attorney general for the State of South Carolina claims
that because county boards of education in his state have considerable autonomy in school management, the case that originated
in South Carolina is a local issue affecting Clarendon County only,
not affecting the other counties of the state. The error in this
theory seems obvious since segregation in Clarendon County and
in all counties in South Carolina has been based upon a provision
in the state constitution that has statewide applicability.
Of more importance is the contention that the decision does not
apply in states that were not parties to the five cases. Technically
that may be true. However, it could be argued that "all others similarly situated" could refer to all Negro children barred from admission to schools attended by white children, no matter where
located. It depends upon how far one can expand the class. Regardless of this point, however, if states not involved directly in
these five cases continue to maintain separate schools, suits will be
brought in each of them and the Court would probably deny certiorari on the ground that the issue had been decided on May 17,
1954. Such was the result in several cases pending before the
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Court on the date it decided these particular cases. 2 1 Probably
some states may await this inevitable result, while others will accept the general principle laid down in the five cases and consider
that it is applicable to the similar situations in their states.
Effect of a Declaration of Unconstitutionality
It has been said that the constitutional provisions and state
laws providing for segregated schools remain on the books of the
various states and are the law until eliminated by state action; that
the declaration by the Court that such provisions violate the Federal Constitution has no immediate effect, especially until the decrees are ordered after the December hearings. What about the
general principle that a provision declared to be unconstitutional
is as if never enacted?
Most of the states, including those that have announced their
intention to abide by the Court's decision without resistance, have
stated that their provisions for segregated schools remain operative until they can be eliminated by state action. Such action, they
say, takes time even when the state officials are willing to proceed.
Had any state initiated the process of repealing a state constitutional provision on the day after the Court announced its ruling,
it could have concluded the process in a matter of months-possibly
in time to remove the provision before the opening of the school
years 1954-55. The possible rapidity of action to amend a state
constitutional provision has been demonstrated in at least one state
which has held a special session of the legislature since the Court's
decision, adopted a proposal to repeal the constitutional provision
providing for a public-school system, and made arrangements for
the proposal to be considered by the voters at a special election.
Equal speed could have been demonstrated to eliminate the unconstitutional provisions for segregation, had any state so desired.
Also, the administrative problems inherent in changing from a
segregated to an integrated school system are said to require time
-yet a number of schools and some entire school systems have
been changed over at least in part at the opening of the fall term
in September 1954, just four months or less from the day the decision was announced.
Noteworthy is the fact that many states that have taken no
action to delete legal provisions for segregated schools have taken
administrative action looking toward integrated schools. These
1 State of Florida ex rel. Hawkins v. Board of Control, 347 U. S. 971; Tureaud v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University and Agricultural
and Mechanical College, 347 U. S. 971; Wichita Falls Junior College District v.
Battle, 204 F. (2d) 632 (C. A. 5th, 1953), cert. den. 347 U. S. 974. Applying the
decision in nonschool areas: Municipally owned amphitheater-Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Assn., 347 U. S. 971; Golf courses-Holcombe v. Beal, 193
F. (2d) 384 (C. A. 5th, 1951), cert. den. 347 U. S. 974; Public housing-Housing
Authority of San Francisco v. Banks, 120 Cal. App. (2d) 1, 260 P. (2d) 668
(1953), cert. den. 347 U. S. 974; In the Hawkins, Tureaud and Muir cases petitions for certiorari granted judgments vacated, cases remanded "for consideration in the light of the segregation cases."
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school officers, apparently, do not believe that they are acting
illegally in ordering or encouraging steps in the integration process in violation of their own state provisions requiring segregated
schools. The fact of the matter is that school officers who are disregarding the state provisions for separate schools cannot be penalized for violation of their state provisions, since they are following the supreme law of the land. Article VI of the Federal Constitution reads,
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof ... shall be the
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges of every State
shall be bound thereby, any thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.
Actually, in the states where the decision has been most bitterly opposed officially, there exists an occasional oasis where the
children of both races have been or are now attending the same
schools. The decision of May 17 makes this procedure legal despite state provisions to the contrary.
Before the Court decided to postpone the decrees and in so
doing postponed the final decision until the October 1954 term, it
had considered whether or not to order desegregation immediately
and to require admission of Negro children "forthwith" to schools
previously attended by white children only. Counsel urged the
Court, that if it so decided, to interpret "forthwith" as meaning
no sooner than the school year 1955-56. Gradual adjustment was
hoped for. The Court recognized the necessity of time for planning, but no one knows how much time the states will be given
after the Court considers the evidence in the December hearings
and learns how much has been accomplished already, how real is
the resistance in some jurisdictions, and how sincere is the attempt
to achieve constitutionality in other jurisdictions.
In the meantime, the states are considering their problems
and making their plans. 2 2 Committees and commissions have been
appointed in almost every one of the Southern states; in some instances with a view toward continuing segregated schools if possible by lawful means, in other instances to recommend methods
for integrating the races. Not all these committees and commissions have issued public reports of their recommendations. 2 3 Yet
it is well known that several states are developing techniques in
preparation for a "last ditch" fight.
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CIRCUMVENTING TECHNIQUES
Although the suggestions may never materialize, a number
"See Soiuthern School News, a factual and objective summary of how the
states are reacting to the segregation decision. Free, sponsored by Ford Foundation. Nashville, Tenn. First issue September 3; second issue, October 1.
Outstanding is the report to the Governor of North Carolina prepared by
the Institute of Government, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 206
pp. August 1954.
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of variations of the "private-school" plan have received considerable publicity and have progressed officially further than any of
the other suggested circumventing techniques. Constitutional
amendments have been proposed and already adopted in South
Carolina making it possible to abolish the public-school system and
permit the education of all children of school age by private-school
facilities.
In the Civil Rights Cases of 1883, the Court held that individual action was beyond the restrictions of the Fourteenth Amendment, that the Amendment applied only to official acts of the state
through one of its official agencies. 24 Today, this distinction no
longer exists. By analogy with nonschool decisions 25 it would appear that the private-school plans would lay the state open to
challenge with less than a 50-50 chance of winning. The private
schools are almost certain to be considered state instrumentalities,
though ostensibly under private control. 26 Also, since public education has been held to be a governmental function in many types of
cases over the years, any institution that performs this function
for the state may be said to be performing a governmental function and hence subject to the same restrictions as would obtain if
the function were performed directly by the government or one
of its official agencies.2 7 State action has been found in so many
controversies over activities conducted by private agencies that
any attempt to maintain a private-school system as a substitute
for the public-schools in order to perpetuate segregation of the
races should be approached with the awareness that such a plan
is likely to do no more than to postpone the "evil" day.
One state suggested, instead of a private-school plan, that
teachers' contracts be executed in such a way that each teacher is
obligated to teach only the children of his own race. Since the
school officers executing these contracts are agents of the state,
their action would obviously be state action, subject to challenge
as an attempt to do indirectly what the state cannot lawfully do
directly. 28 The illegality of this plan appears even more certain
than that of the private-school scheme.
Another state has proposed to give local school authorities ex-2109 U. S. 3 (1883).
Especially important are the following cases:
Muir v. Louisville Park
Theatrical Assn. 347 U. S. 971 (1954) vacating judgment of Court of Appeals
of Sixth Circuit, ibid. 202 F. (2d) 275 (C. A. 6th, 1953); Terry v. Adams, 345
U. S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649 (1944); Baskin v. Brown,
-

174 F. (2d) 391 (C. A. 4th, 1949); Rice v. Elmore, 165 F. (2d) 387 (C. A. 4th,
1947); Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Library of Baltimore City, 149 F. (2d) 212
(C. A. 4th, 1945) ; Nash v. Air Terminal Services, 85 F. Supp. 545, 549 (D. Va.,
1949); Lawrence v. Hancock, 76 F. Supp. 1004 (D. W. Va., 1948); Culver v.
City of Warren, 84 Ohio App. 373, 83 N. E. (2d) 82 (1948) ; City Commissioners
of City of Newton, 151 Kans. 565, 100 P. (2d) 709 (1940).
:' Action of private organizations has been considered state action, making
the private organizations instrumentalities of the state. The cases, cited supra
note 25, show the extent to which "state action" has been held to exist.
-TMarsh v. Alabama, 326 U. S. 501 (1945).
"IYick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 (1886).
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clusive power of assignment of pupils. If Negro students are initially enrolled in a school with white children, they could be transferred under the power of assignment. Again, illegality is thinly
veiled.
Other suggestions have been made, but in any of the techniques planned to circumvent the effect of the decision there is
ample cause for complaint on the part of those denied their constitutional right. Any of these plans, if they accomplish their objective, would continue a situation that the Court has declared
unconstitutional. Although there is no precedent exactly in point,
states that throw up roadblocks are certain to be called to account.
On the other hand, states that proceed affirmatively toward an
integrated program of public education may avoid reprimand by
the Court if their intentions are sincere and their gradulism is due
to administrative problems or fiscal difficulties.
JUDICIAL SUPERVISION OVER ENFORCEMENT

The Court has not decided how it will enforce its decrees.
Possibly it will exert no supervision; it did not do so in connection
with the graduate-school segregation cases. The Court, on the
other hand, may appoint special masters to formulate detailed
standards. Equally possible would be the time-honored custom of
remanding the five cases to the lower courts in which they originated, instructing these courts to work out detailed arrangements
with the states.
Discussion of these possibilities in advance of the decrees of
the Court is premature. Suffice it to say that none of the suggestions would establish new precedents in equity remedies.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

An attempt has been made in this paper to restrict the discussion to the legal points of constitutional law and judicial procedure of greatest interest to the legal profession, apart from the
subject matter of segregation in the public schools, interest in
social and educational repercussions of the May 17 decision in the
public-school segregation cases having overshadowed those legal
principles.
It was shown that the intent of framers and ratifiers of a constitutional amendment is not controlling, especially when that intent cannot be conclusively proved; that, though proof were conclusive, the Constitution is to be interpreted in the light of current
situations rather than by the meaning its framers and ratifiers
might have intended.
The rights guaranteed in the Fourteenth Amendment will be
enforced by judicial process regardless of the fact that one section of that Amendment grants concurrent power of enforcement
to the Congress, or the fact that the Tenth Amendment reserves to
the states some particular power. In other words, fundamental
rights cannot be invaded under the theory of states' rights; nor
need they await the legislative action of Congress.
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The Court in its plenary power to act in equity may frame its
decree in any way that its judgment dictates is for the best interest of the public and may postpone a decree to allow wrongdoers
time to plan procedures to correct their unlawful practices.
A situation declared to be unconstitutional is unconstitutional
for all who have created the situation. Even though a decree should
apply only to the parties of a suit or to all those similarly situated
in the same jurisdiction, the matter will be res adjudicatafor those
not parties to the suit. And this result will obtain whether or not
the nonlitigants participate in hearings called for the purpose of
planning practical application of the principle already announced.
Even though the unconstitutional provisions remain on the
books, they can no longer be enforced and those who follow the
supreme law of the land cannot be penalized for failure to abide
by a contrary state provision. Those who encourage the modification of a practice to coincide with the pronouncement of the Court
are acting in accordance with the law, regardless of contrary provisions of state or local jurisdictions.
The public-school segregation cases illustrate these principles
of constitutional law and judicial procedure. Perhaps "nothing
new has been added" in these respects, but the subject matter
makes the decision of May 17 a bench mark in the evolution of our
Country.
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